Iran: The US diversion from internal problems

The US have have been incredible successful so far in keeping their leaky ship afloat...simply by diverting attention from the problems they are having to external (often imaginary) threats.

GlobalEuropean Anticipation Bulletin wrote as early as March 2007 about the looming crisis and how it would be pushing Washington to confront Iran.

The US entry into the « very great depression » generates a stream of domestic crises: political (daily oppositions between Congress and President), economic (entry into recession), financial (bursting of housing-financial bubble) and social (millions of Americans put out on the street). Such a critical domestic situation is pushing Washington to the confrontation with Iran, in order to divert the nation’s attention from internal problems.

Well, the crisis is definitely here, and I fear that with the extensive reporting on the Iranian "election fraud" and the post-election violence, the US might just have found a good excuse to intervene.

I recently came across an analysis paper published by think tank "The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brooklyn Institution" in June 2009, titled Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran. The paper has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent disclosure of confidential information.

The authors discuss four options to tackle Iran: The Diplomatic Options, The Military Options, Regime Change or Containment. The military option includes, among others, "allowing or encouraging Israeli military strike" and the regime change option includes , among others, "supporting a popular uprising".

Since the paper is 156 pages long, I have not had time to read through all the information, but I have picked up some quite interesting suggestions by scanning though the paper. Starting on page 66, the paper presents an overview of the policy involving toppling through invasion. They state that invading Iran through a ground invasion would be daunting in "the absence of a sufficiently horrific provocation" (p. 66).

Their dream seems to be if Iran would provoke the united States by an Iranian-backed terrorist attack as sizable as 9/11.

For purposes of this analytic exercise, we assume that a U.S. invasion of Iran is not triggered by an overt, incontrovertible, and unforgivable act of aggression—something on the order of an Iranian-backed 9/11, in which the planes bore Iranian markings and Tehran boasted about its sponsorship. First, this seems exceptionally unlikely given Iran’s history of avoiding such acts, at least since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Second, were that ever to happen, the circumstances of an invasion would become almost easy—the United States would suddenly have enormous domestic and (perhaps grudging) international support for undertaking an invasion. Indeed, the entire question of “options” would become irrelevant at that point: what American president could refrain from an invasion after the Iranians had just killed several thousand American civilians in an attack in the United States itself? Beyond such a blatant act of of inexcusable aggression, the question of provocation gets murky. Most European, Asian, and Middle Eastern publics are dead set against any American military action against Iran derived from the current differences between Iran and the international community—let alone Iran and the United States. Other than a Tehran-sponsored 9/11, it is hard to imagine what would change their minds. For many democracies and some fragile autocracies to which Washington would be looking for support, this public antipathy is likely to prove decisive. (p. 66)

To even consider such a horrible thing as something positive is disgraceful and shows how this think tank has very little concern over the value of human lives and looks more at the interests of the power horny elite.

The paper goes on in examining US options if they are unable to get international support for an invasion and stresses the importance of support from the American people as a partial conscription might be necessary.

Because the military requirements of the occupation and reconstruction of Iran are so daunting, and the likelihood of international support in this scenario appears so low, the first and most important requirement would be the overwhelming political support of the American people for an invasion. Simply put, compared to U.S. involvement in Iraq, the invasion and reconstruction of Iran is likely to be a more taxing task—even assuming that the United States avoids repeating the mistakes of Iraq—and there will be even less foreign assistance to accomplish it. This means that the president would have to have such strong and enduring support from the American people that he would be able to conduct the invasion and occupation of Iran employing essentially only American resources and in the face of widespread international animosity. He might need to mobilize fully the National Guard as well as the Army, Marine, and possibly Navy Reserves and keep them in uniform for months or even years if there is considerable Iranian resistance, as there may well be. In worst-case scenarios, the president might even need to ask the American people to accept some form of limited conscription. If the occupation of Iran were to go badly, there might be considerable American casualties for long periods of time—possibly even more than in Iraq at its worst because of the more difficult terrain, the likely greater hostility of the populace, and the greater proficiency in guerrilla warfare of the Iranian military. If the president can secure this kind of support, an invasion of Iran is a viable option. Without such support, the invasion and occupation of Iran would likely be as mismanaged and tragic as it was in Iraq from 2003 to 2006. (p. 71)

I would hope that the American people are smart enough not to support an invasion. And if Iran was able to carry out a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 (with many casualties), my hope is that the Americans can still see though the scam. Why the hell should it be OK for the US to allow such an attack in order to invade Iran? It is absolutely disgusting.

On page 84, some mind-blowing sentences appear. They discuss how hard it would be to convince the International community that there are no other ends but to invade Iran through air strikes.

The truth is that these all would be challenging cases to make. For that reason, it would be far more preferable if the United States could cite an Iranian provocation as justification for the airstrikes before launching them. Clearly, the more outrageous, the more deadly, and the more unprovoked the Iranian action, the better off the United States would be. Of course, it would be very difficult for the United States to goad Iran into such a provocation without the rest of the world recognizing this game, which would then undermine it. (One method that would have some possibility of success would be to ratchet up covert regime change efforts in the hope that Tehran would retaliate overtly, or even semi-overtly, which could then be portrayed as unprovoked act of Iranian aggression.)

The paper also addresses that Iran probably never will be a threat to the United States, but on the other hand, it could be a threat to Israel. And as we know, Israel and the United States are like two peas in a pot.

Crisis after crisis has arisen between Iran and the United States but Iran has never been and almost certainly never will be an existential threat to the United States. It harbors no territorial designs on the United States, has never conducted a terrorist operation aimed at the American homeland, and, even should it acquire nuclear weapons, lacks the delivery systems to threaten the United States directly. Further, its economy is anemic, and even if substantially reformed, will probably never provide the base for Iran to make itself a challenger to the United States on par with Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, or Communist China. But for Israel, Iran is a much more dangerous opponent—it is close and threatening. There is a virtual consensus in Israel that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. (p. 89)

It is clear from discussions with Israeli military and intelligence officials, and from numerous press leaks and reports that Israel is well under way in planning for a military operation to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak, said in 2007 that “the things that we do behind the scenes, far from the public eye, are far more important than the slogan charade,” implying that Israeli covert capabilities are already hard at work trying to cope with the Iranian threat and preparing to attack it if they must. (p. 90)

The Israeli option has both pros and cons that are addressed. But perhaps the more interesting part of the paper, in the light of current events, comes when they start to discuss the possibility of bolstering regime change.

[I]n theory the United States has several options if it seeks a new Iranian government. In the past, the United States engineered a coup to restore a government of its liking there and in recent years, Washington has supported programs designed to bolster a democratic movement in Iran. Prominent voices have also called for helping Iranian oppositionists overthrow the regime and for using Iran’s minority groups to undermine the government. (p. 101)

The United States could play multiple roles in facilitating a revolution. By funding and helping organize domestic rivals of the regime, the United States could create an alternative leadership to seize power. [...] U.S.-backed media outlets could highlight regime shortcomings and make otherwise obscure critics more prominent. [...] U.S. economic pressure (and perhaps military pressure as well) can discredit the regime, making the population hungry for a rival leadership. (p. 105)

For example, if Iran retaliated with a major terrorist attack that killed large numbers of people or a terrorist attack involving WMDs—especially on U.S. soil—Washington might decide that an invasion was the only way to deal with such a dangerous Iranian regime. Indeed, for this same reason, efforts to promote regime change in Iran might be intended by the U.S. government as deliberate provocations to try to goad the Iranians into an excessive response that might then justify an American invasion. (p. 150)

I have just addressed some of the suggestions put forward in the paper as to how Iran may be destabilized. It is no surprise that the US has been working on this for quite some time and that they have been involved in coups before and would not rule out that possibility again. Based on the paper, do you think that the US may be involved in the current situation in Iran?